

LIBYA CRISIS PROFILE

June 2016

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OVERVIEW

MAIN CONCERNS

Since the uprising that overthrew the Government of Muammar al Qadhafi in 2011, Libya has been marked by political instability and the spread of armed militia. Following the 2011 revolution, the country experienced its first power divide in mid-2014, when the Islamist-dominated General National Congress (GNC) refused to step down for the newly elected House of Representatives (HoR). A second fragmentation occurred, when following more than a year of peace talks, a UN-backed unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA) was announced in early 2016. Both the GNC, based in Tripoli, and the HoR, based in Tobruk, spoke out against the GNA and refused to step down (see page 3).

Over 200 civilians have been killed by fighting since the start of 2016. Active conflict, around Benghazi, Derna, Misratah and Sirte, continues to cause civilian casualties, displacement and damage to infrastructure. Apart from these areas, the conflict appears to have ceased over the past months, partly due to signing of reconciliation agreements between different armed groups. However, the lack of law and order continues to result in countrywide protection concerns, with armed groups engaged in arbitrary detention, torture, and disappearances. Criminal networks profit from the power vacuum and an estimated 27,000 migrants have been smuggled from Libya to Italy since the start of 2016 (see page 6).

The whole population continues to be affected by the liquidity crisis, reduction in income sources, the breakdown of the welfare state, and damage to critical infrastructure. Priority humanitarian needs include access to healthcare, WASH and livelihoods. IDPs, migrants and traditionally marginalised groups have been identified as those most in need of support (see page 9 to 13). The latest available information on the number of people in need, from September 2015, indicates that 2.4 million people require humanitarian assistance. This amounts to almost 40% of Libya’s estimated population of 6.3 million. Areas hosting a large number of IDPs, such as Benghazi which accounts for about 25% of the total IDP population, are struggling to cope with the increased demand in water and health infrastructure.

TOTAL POPULATION IN NEED ≈ 2.4 Million

Non-Displaced in need 1.75 Million <small>(as at September 2015)</small>	IDPs 425,250 <small>(June 2016, in all areas apart from Harawa, Sirte, Al Jaghub and Misratah)</small>	Vulnerable migrants/refugees 250,000 <small>(as at September 2015)</small>
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INFORMATION GAPS

Sources: HNO 09/2015, IOM 05/2016

Despite ongoing data collection initiatives, large information gaps remain. In light of the funding constraints and significant difficulties in accessing large parts of the country, additional data sharing and collection to inform response priorities across geographic areas and sectors is required. There is a lack of regularly updated information on the situation of the population in hard-to-access areas, the availability and price of basic items on the main markets, and the functionality of critical infrastructure such as hospitals, electricity, and water networks (see page 7).

SITUATION MAP


Armed clashes

The main focus of the current armed conflict is the military operation to push Islamic State (IS) out of Sirte, its main base within Libya. Rival governments in Tripoli and Tobruk are both engaged in the fight against IS in an attempt to consolidate their position.

The presence of Islamic State is galvanising international military involvement in Libya, with ongoing informal support to armed actors. The possibility of an international military has been discussed.

Meanwhile, localised armed clashes between militias around strategic infrastructure, including the border crossing with Tunisia and oil infrastructure, continue to be reported

Generalised presence of armed groups (Libyan insider 05/05/2016, Media)



Humanitarian access

The ability of humanitarian organisations to provide relief is hampered by the widespread insecurity and localised fighting. Most of the international organisations operate out of Tunis, following the deterioration of the security situation in 2014. The latest UN funding appeal for humanitarian response is only 26% covered, further limiting the scope of interventions. At the same time, the population are often unable to access basic needs due to insecurity and restrictions posed by armed groups.

Displacement

The latest escalation of the conflict in June 2014 resulted in large-scale displacement from neighbourhoods in Tripoli and Benghazi. By June 2016, over 425,000 IDPs were identified, primarily from the east of the country. The current push to dislodge IS from strategic areas is expected to result in further mass displacement.

Benghazi is particularly affected by displacement. More than a third of the original population of the city, or almost 190,000 people, was found to be displaced in June 2016. Most (60%) remain in the city. As a result, the city currently hosts the largest share of all IDPs in Libya. However, with conflict having de-escalated in many parts of the city, increasing returns are recorded.

DRIVERS OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

Until 2011, the estimated 6 million people residing in Libya enjoyed a high standard of living, with access to government-sponsored healthcare, education, water, and subsidised food. Today, the whole population is affected by the armed conflict and the lack of a functioning government. The complex humanitarian crisis is primarily driven by the absence of the rule of law, lack of access to basic services, and displacement.

ABSENCE OF LAW AND ORDER

Lack of central authority: The lack of a centralised governing authority is at the root of the armed conflict and absence of law and order. The fall of the al Qadhafi government in 2011 has resulted in a political and security vacuum. Additional to the Government of National Accord, Libya has two alternative centres of power: the General National Congress (GNC), based in Tripoli, and the House of Representatives (HoR), based in Tobruk.

The continuing political deadlock is aggravating the widespread insecurity, and has led to a further fragmentation in service provision

In Tripoli, a large number of GNC members has voted to amend Libya's constitution to approve the UN peace plan and allowed the GNA to gradually take over ministries in Tripoli (*The Guardian* 06/04/2016; *Reuters* 25/04/2016). However, the GNC president and prime minister have denounced the vote and threatened to challenge the constitutional ruling in the Supreme Court. Although western Libyan militias have shifted their support to the GNA, the GNC still poses a threat to Libya's stability, as it retains areas of influence across the country (*Stratfor* 13/06/2016).

In Tobruk, the HoR enjoys the support of the Libyan National Army (LNA) and its leader, General Khalifa Haftar. The opposition in Eastern Libya currently poses the main challenge to Libya's unity. Although legislators are required to vote on accepting and joining the UN-backed unity government, they have largely refused to do so since the peace deal was signed in late 2015. Additionally, due to strong links between the Speaker of the Tobruk parliament, Aguila Saleh Issa, and General Khalifa Haftar, the LNA exerts vast military control over the eastern part of the country, including Benghazi, al-Beyda and Tobruk. The LNA is a combination of military units and tribal or regional-based armed

groups, and is not recognised as a proper army by all military personnel across the East or West of Libya (*ECFR* 2016, *Access on* 16/04/2016).

The extensive involvement of international actors, based on political and economic interests, continues to have a significant influence on the political dynamics. Egypt has had an ambiguous role in the Libyan conflict. On one hand, diplomats and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have expressed support for the UN-led political process. On the other hand, the security apparatus has supported General Haftar despite his open disapproval for the GNA and close ties to the HoR. Similarly, although the UAE has reportedly shown more support for the UN-led political process, it has not halted weapon deliveries to Haftar and militias from Zintan (*ECFR* 2016, *Access on* 16/04/2016).

This political division, backed and compounded by local tribal interests and international interventions, aggravates the armed conflict, with clashes between militias supporting rival political factions and armed groups taking advantage of the lack of a formal security system to expand power. The protracted political standoff facilitated the spread of IS in 2014. It also led to a fragmentation in service provision. The HoR has created its own national oil company, investment authority, and national bank, resulting in the further splintering of policies and services (*ECFR* 25/05/2016, *Stratfor* 02/04/2016, *Critical Threats* 03/03/2016, *CMO* 04/08/2015).

Armed clashes: There have been over 200 documented civilian casualties due to direct conflict since the start of 2016 and fighting is ongoing in the cities of Benghazi, Derna, Ajdabiya, Sirte and around Misratah (*UNSMIL* 06/06/2016, *CMO* 04/08/2015, *UNSMIL* 01/06/2016). The main current conflict is around Sirte, where the Libyan National Army (LNA) and militias operating under the umbrella of the GNA are attempting to push IS out of Sirte (*ACLEd* 10/06/2016).

The conflict is characterised by the large number of armed groups, an estimated 1,000 and 1,700 in mid-2015 (*CMO* 04/08/2015), some of which have formed coalitions in support of one of the three political authorities. There are some indications that the conflict dynamics are changing. The GNA is increasingly able to consolidate armed groups into one organised structure, with a lower number of new political militias formed between March and May 2016 compared to September 2015–February 2016 (*ACLEd* 10/06/2016). The defeat of IS is a major source of competition between the GNA and Libya National Army (LNA) forces, who are aligned to the HoR (*The Economist* 14/05/2016).

While both leaders of the GNA and LNA stated that there will not be an international military intervention, reports indicate that either side receives extensive military support from different countries, despite the arms embargo, which has been in place since 2011 (UNSC 09/03/2016, ACLED 10/06/2016, Reuters 24/02/2016). Without a political agreement between the HoR and GNA there is a high risk of increasing violent confrontations between militias aligned to the opposing sites.

Criminality and human rights abuses: Criminal and cross-border smuggling networks thrive in Libya, due to its vast terrain, lack of strong state institutions, and permeable borders (Clingendael 03/07/2015). Torture, arbitrary detention, and disappearances by criminal networks and armed groups are widespread. Since 2014, dozens of civilians have been reported abducted in Tripoli and Benghazi for their actual or suspected tribal, family, or religious affiliation. Those who have pledged allegiance to IS continue to commit serious human rights abuses, including unlawful killings and summary executions (HRW 15/01/2016, OHCHR 15/02/2016). The domestic criminal justice system has collapsed in most parts of the country, exacerbating the human rights crisis (OHCHR 15/02/2016).

LIMITED ACCESS TO BASIC SERVICES AND AID

Breakdown of the welfare state:

Most public services, such as health, education and water, were provided at no cost to the population before the uprising in 2011 and these services continue to depend on government support. Important staples such as wheat are still heavily subsidized.

In 2012, the large majority of the population (84%) worked in the public sector and public sector salaries and pensions are still the main source of income (CESVI 29/02/2016, REACH 12/03/2016, World Bank 2014).

While the Libyan population continues to rely heavily on government institutions for source of income and provision of public services, the contracting economy is making it increasingly difficult to pay salaries and address basic needs. The reduction in oil revenues, over 90% of government income in 2010, has put pressure on public finances (National Resource Governance Institute 2013). The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts Libyan GDP to fall more than 8% in 2016, making it the world's worst-performing economy

Government institutions are struggling to maintain the required levels of spending on subsidies, salaries and pensions, the main sources of income for Libyan households.

(Economist 02/01/2016). Around 85% of the Libyan Investment Authority's USD 67 billion of assets are frozen because of UN Security Council sanctions (Stratfor 02/04/2016).

Government institutions are consequently struggling to maintain the required levels of spending on public services and salaries (FT 24/01/2016). Public sector salary payments and pensions are often delayed or not distributed at all (REACH 12/03/2016). There have been discussions on whether subsidies should be replaced by cheaper alternatives (Libya's Channel 26/05/2016, Reuters 25/05/2015). Any further reduction of the functionality of public services and especially salary and pension payments would immediately and significantly result in an intensification of the humanitarian needs.

Damage to critical infrastructure: According to the Minister of Health, 60–70% of hospitals are closed or only partially functioning, due to shelling, looting and occupation by armed groups (Le Figaro 03/04/2016). Disruptions to the water network, including due to deliberate action of armed groups, water pollution, and the lack of electricity to power the main water network have resulted in water shortages (REACH 12/03/2016, OHCHR 15/02/2016). Water provision to the coastal cities is fully reliant on the pumping of pure freshwater from the south. The water pipelines run parallel to the oil and gas pipelines and with the current fight over resources further damages are a concern.

High food prices and liquidity crisis: The primary barrier to accessing food in conflict-affected communities across Libya is the lack of financial resources coupled with rising food prices. The breakdown of law and order has resulted in a lack of price regulation and substantial price increases. Libyan citizens are largely dependent on foreign currency to purchase food items and medical care and a deteriorating exchange rate is resulting in even higher prices. The current exchange rate on the black market, the main source of foreign currency for Libyan households, was LD 4 to 1 USD in May 2016, compared to an official exchange rate of LD 1.2 in 2010 (Libya Herald 05/05/2016, IB Times 11/10/2015, REACH 12/03/2016).

The breakdown of law and order has resulted in a lack of price regulation and substantial price increases.

The shortage of cash in banks has led to strict limitations on withdrawals, including of public sector salaries and pensions. The Libyan financial system has been weakened by the competition between two of the rival governments over the control of state financial institutions. The release of a second set of Libyan dinar banknotes in June by the HoR central bank is expected to further disrupt the financial system (Guardian 20/05/2016).

Obstacles to accessing aid and services:

The population is often unable to access the aid available due to restricted movement. Civilians are trapped in several areas affected by fighting in Benghazi. Freedom of movement from areas controlled by jihadist groups, for instance in Sirte, is limited (UNSMIL 21/04/2016, UNSMIL 04/06/2016). Migrants and groups perceived as having supported the al Qadhafi government, particularly the Tawergha community, are traditionally marginalised and face discrimination in accessing services (OHCHR 15/02/2016).

Migrants and groups perceived as having supported the al Qadhafi government face discrimination in accessing services.

Since July 2014, most humanitarian agencies have relocated out of Libya to Tunisia and are working solely through implementing partners. Areas under the control of IS, including the city of Sirte, are largely inaccessible to actors, including Libyan NGOs (WFP 15/05/2016). However, the Libya Inter Agency Task Force reports that the main operational constraint is funding, not access, with only 26% of the USD 166 million UN appeal covered (WFP 08/06/2016, FTS 13/06/2016).

DISPLACEMENT


Internal displacement: Several assessments have identified IDPs as among the most in need (UNHCR 11/02/2016, REACH 12/03/2016, SCI and HI 21/03/2016). There have been multiple waves of displacement in Libya since the uprising in 2011. The vast majority of people have been displaced since the conflict intensified in mid-2014. The fourth round of the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) recorded over 425,000 IDPs in Libya as of June 2016, almost 7% of the total population. The actual number could be higher, as the data collected does not cover the inaccessible areas of Harawa, Sirte, Al Jaghhub and Misratah. Half of the IDPs recorded by the DTM live in rented houses (IOM 06/2016). Many face eviction, given rising food prices and rents. At least 20%, or over 81,000 IDPs, reside in collective and informal centres such as schools, with limited access to services (REACH 12/03/2016, SCI and HI 21/03/2016). Tawergha IDP populations are particularly vulnerable and many of them having been displaced multiple times. (IOM 20/06/2016)

Status of migrants and asylum seekers: An estimated 700,000 to 1 million migrants reside and work in Libya, mainly from Nigeria, Egypt, Ghana, Chad, Mali, and Sudan. Asylum-seekers and migrants in Libya face significant protection concerns, with their status making them particularly vulnerable to abuse, marginalisation, and exploitation.

Migrants and asylum seekers who move through the country, for instance when attempting to travel to Europe, are exposed to widespread abuses along the route. (Amnesty International 14/06/2016)

Libyan law criminalises entering, exiting and staying in Libya irregularly and allows for the indefinite detention of foreign nationals for the purpose of deportation. Migrants are at risk of being arrested and detained at any time when out in public. In addition, people who are intercepted in Libyan waters when travelling irregularly to Europe are held in detention centres in Libya. These migrant detention centres are officially headed by the Department to Combat Irregular Migration, but in practice many are run by members of armed groups. Conditions in detention are reportedly dire, with very limited access to legal support, basic medical care and sanitation. Violence and sexual abuse is widespread (Amnesty International 14/06/2016, IRIN 01/06/2016). As many as 6,800 of the around 264,000 migrants identified by the DTM in June were residing in a detention centre at the time of the assessment (IOM 06/2016).

Main locations of IDPs and migrants Source: IOM 05/2016




MIGRATION FLOWS

MIGRATION OVERVIEW

Libya is both an important destination and, because of its strategic position vis-à-vis Europe, a transit country for people from other parts of Africa and the Middle East. Before 2011, an estimated 2.5 million migrants were residing in Libya and the economy was heavily reliant on the migrant labour force. Despite the crisis, Libya still provides employment opportunities to migrants and an estimated 700,000 to 1 million migrants remain in Libya (IOM 05/2016).

Libya is increasingly a transit instead of a destination country. Smugglers interviewed in May 2016 estimate that as many as 8,000 migrants from sub-Saharan African countries cross into Libya each month via the Tumo border crossing with Niger (one of the three crossing points). IOM estimates that, on average, around 5,500 migrants per month left from Libya towards Italy in the first five months of 2016 (UNICEF 31/05/2016, IRIN 01/06/2016).

Both the **central** and **eastern** Mediterranean route have seen a significant increase in arrivals over the past 1–2 years (Source: FRONTEX 01/2016)




Irregular movement from Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya to Italy, known as the Central Mediterranean Route, increased dramatically in 2014. Between 2000 and 2014, Arrivals from Libya to Italy were mostly below 40,000 annually. In 2014, this figure skyrocketed when almost 180,000 people arrived in Italy, mostly from Libya (compared with 40,000 the year before). This increase is attributed to the implementation of a large search and rescue mission by the Italian navy (operation Mare Nostrum), as well as the escalation of violence and accompanying power vacuum in Libya (FRONTEX 01/01/2016, IAI 15/05/2015).

Numbers remain high in 2016 (46,000 in the first five months), similar to the number of arrivals during the same period in 2015 (47,500) (UNICEF 31/05/2016, IOM 31/05/2016). During the first six months of 2016, at least 2,400 people died while making the crossing from Tunisia, Egypt and primarily Libya to Italy (IOM 07/06/2016).

Main migration crossing points

Source: IOM 05/2016



MAIN PUSH AND PULL FACTORS

Movement of migrants from and through Libya is influenced by several factors. A change in one or in a combination is likely to alter the number of people moving from Libya to Europe and the type of routes:

- **The strength of criminal networks managing human smuggling in Libya:** Informal trade with Libya's neighbours is one of the cornerstones of a wider illicit economy, which has flourished in the power vacuum. There are indications that jihadist and

other armed groups currently active in Libya facilitate human smuggling as a source of income and as a way to expand areas of control (IAI 15/05/2015).

- **Availability of other routes:** It is unclear whether the agreement between the EU and Turkey to reduce migration, which came into effect on 20 March 2016, has resulted in a move from the Turkey–Greece route to the Central Mediterranean route. So far, no evidence of a significant diversion of Syrians, Afghans or Iraqis to the Central Mediterranean route has been recorded (UNHCR 31/05/2016).
- **The emergence of conflicts and difficult living situation** in the countries of origin of migrants and asylum-seekers. People arriving in Italy via the Central Mediterranean Route since the beginning of the year are mostly from Eritrea, Nigeria, the Gambia, and Somalia. A 2015 study found that those from northeast African countries primarily cited political reasons, violence and conflict as reason for movement, while those from west Africa reported family tensions and inter-personal difficulties as the reason for leaving (IOM 07/06/2016, IAI 15/05/2015).
- **A tradition of open doors:** Open doors and visa waivers for most sub-Saharan countries were implemented in 1990 as part of al Qadhafi's Pan-African ideology. Even though the "open-door" policy in Libya ended in 2011, the tradition of movement through its porous borders remains.
- **European policy:** Several European policies have influenced the modus operandus of smuggling networks. The introduction of operation Mare Nostrum in 2014, for instance, resulted in smugglers leaving migrants in international waters, to be rescued by the Italian coastguard, instead of transporting people to land (KAS 01/2016, ISS 01/12/2015). On 7 June the European Commission announced further plans to enhance cooperation and partnerships with key third countries to manage migration. Libya was identified as one of the priority countries. Any change in agreement is expected to impact movement (Reuters 23/05/2016, Libya Herald 16/07/2016, Amnesty International 14/06/2016).
- **Insecurity:** Migrants primarily depart from the west of the country and from Tajoura and Tobruk in the east. Insecurity around these ports and along the migration routes is likely to reduce movement. According to testimonies gathered in May 2016 in Italy, some migrants from East Africa choose to pass through Egypt in order to avoid armed violence in Libya (IOM 05/2016, IOM 07/06/2016).

THE INFORMATION LANDSCAPE

AVAILABLE INFORMATION

Between mid-2015 and mid-2016, several assessments on the humanitarian situation within Libya have been made public, the main ones being:

- **Multi-sectoral assessments:** The Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA) in June 2015 and an update of a part of the MSNA in February 2015.
- **Protection:** Handicap International/Save the Children Protection Assessment in Benghazi and Tripoli, a UNHCR IDP Protection Monitoring Assessment, the findings of an investigation by the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the findings of field visits to four detention centres by Human Rights Watch.
- **Health:** IMC Health facility assessment.

In addition, there is a monthly updated monitoring system in place to track displacement (The Displacement Tracking Matrix) and one for tracking civilian casualties by month (UNSMIL).

PRIORITIES FOR DATA COLLECTION

Due to limited access, assessing the population's needs is a major challenge. Information that is collected is not consistently shared and large information gaps remain. Based on a review of the publicly available information and (expected) humanitarian needs, the following priorities for data collection can be identified. Please note that some of this information will be already available, for instance within the Local Crisis Committees or Ministries, while other information gaps require additional primary data collection. An update of the 2016 Libya Humanitarian Response Plan is currently under way and assessments feeding into this process will address some of the outstanding information gaps.

Geographic information gaps

- **Hard-to-reach areas:** All assessments focus on accessible areas and there is very limited information on the situation among hard-to-reach populations, such as in Misratah, Benghazi, and Sirte. As the population in these areas is likely to be among

the most in need, additional data collection is required, for instance through remote data collection.

- **Areas under control of IS/jihadist groups:** The situation in areas controlled by jihadist groups is of particular concern. Experience from assessments of Islamic State-controlled areas in Syria and Iraq should be used to collect information in these areas where (protection) needs can be assumed to be severe.
- **Prioritisation of geographic areas:** The available information only provides a limited evidence base to allow for prioritisation between geographic areas. Future data collection exercises should aim to provide comparable information on the severity of humanitarian needs in different areas to enable prioritisation.

Monitoring of needs

To capture the fluidity of the situation and evolving needs, the following regularly updated information is required:

- **Priority needs of most vulnerable groups:** Assessments indicate that IDPs and refugees/migrants are most in need. Frequently updated information on their priority needs is therefore required.
- **Health:** The collapse of the health system has resulted in significant health concerns. Very few health centres still report to the national health information system and there is no early warning alert and response system in place. There is an urgent need to (re)-establish these systems.
- **Market monitoring:** Most of the population relies on the market for basic needs, particularly food. Monitoring of the availability and price of key food items and access to financial infrastructure is therefore required.
- **Response mapping:** There is currently limited insight into who is providing what kind support and where. A 4W, including Libyan national actors, is therefore necessary.
- **Conflict incidence:** Although UNSMIL documents civilian casualties, there is no comprehensive, timely data collection of security incidents affecting civilians. This information is required to understand the conflict dynamics and to inform humanitarian access strategies.

In-depth assessments

To inform geographic and sectoral prioritisation of the response, detailed information is required on:

- **Infrastructure damage:** The levels of damage to critical infrastructure, including housing and water networks. While information is being collected on the state of oil infrastructure, data on the impact of violence on other infrastructure is not available.
- **Nutrition:** Additional research is required on levels of malnutrition. Although the pre-crisis nutritional data indicate very low levels of undernutrition, the key macroeconomic factors that contributed to ensure Libya's high standards of food security have been dramatically affected by the current crisis.
- **Mines and ERW:** ERW contamination in Libya is extensive, but as yet unquantified.
- **Coping mechanisms:** There is only limited information available on how the population is coping with the breakdown in services and how to best support already ongoing efforts to obtain basic needs and services.
- **Access in different areas of control:** The fragmentation of the country has resulted in different levels of access for humanitarian organisations. These access conditions should be mapped and shared to support and expand humanitarian programming.

Annex A – Sector Briefs

PROTECTION

PRE-CRISIS CONTEXT

Arbitrary detention and disappearances: Libya has a long history of detaining people involved in political activities (HRW 2010).

Discrimination: Discrimination and harassment of minority tribes such as Tawergha, Tuareg, Toubou, and the Mashashyia is widespread. Many lack citizenship documentation (UK Home Office. Libya: Minority and Ethnic Groups. 18/02/2015).

Limited refugee rights: Libya criminalises entering, staying in, or leaving Libya irregularly, without distinguishing between migrants, refugees or victims of trafficking. The 2010 Law on Combating Irregular Migration allows for the indefinite detention and deportation of those considered to be irregular migrants (Amnesty International 11/05/2015). Libya is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (European Commission 22/12/2014).

CURRENT SITUATION

Indiscriminate attacks: Across Libya, warring factions show little regard for avoiding or minimising loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects. Imprecise weaponry is used in densely populated residential areas in what often amount to indiscriminate attacks. UNSMIL has received reports that airstrikes by Operation Dignity, the former Libya Dawn, and in one instance the Egyptian air force, led to civilian casualties and/or damage to civilian infrastructure (OHCHR 15/02/2016, HRW 24/01/2016).

Collapse of justice system: Since 2014, judges and prosecutors have been targeted in killings, court bombings, assaults, and abductions. As a result, courts in Derna, Sirte, and Benghazi ceased activities in 2014, with activities only partially resumed in parts of Benghazi in 2015 (OHCHR 15/02/2016). In Tripoli, the Supreme Court's ability to function is threatened by the division between the two rival authorities and deteriorating security conditions (OHCHR 15/02/2016, HRW 01/02/2016).

Vulnerable migrants: Migrants residing and working in Libya are exposed to harassment, discrimination and limited access to services. Many migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees become victims of violence, coercion and abuse when moving along smuggling routes and in connection houses, where they await departure to Europe. Migrations who

are detained, for instance because they were arrested at a checkpoint or when irregularly travelling to Europe, are exposed to widespread abuse within the detention centres. These centres are often run by militia groups and detainees are held for indefinite periods of time without access to sufficient food, water, sanitation or legal support. Some unverified reports from Libya say that "torture camps" have begun to emerge, where militias hold Eritreans and Sudanese for ransom (IRIN 01/06/2016, UNSMIL 08/05/2015, Libya Body Count. Access 03/06/2016, ISS 01/12/2015).

Arbitrary detention and torture: The use of torture has been widely reported, particularly in detention facilities. Torture methods include beatings and electrocution, prolonged suspension in stress positions, solitary confinement, deprivation of adequate food or water, threats of sexual nature and extortion. Torture has resulted in the death of detainees in various facilities, including those run by the military police and military intelligence (OHCHR 15/02/2016, HRW 2015/12/03).

Loss of documentation: Loss of legal documentation is reported as a prevalent protection concern among IDP families. With the collapse of local state infrastructure, there are limited opportunities to renew lost documentation (UNHCR/REACH 31/05/2016, CESVI 29/02/2016).

Child protection: Child recruitment is a common occurrence across the country (SC 18/06/2016). Males from 15 years of age regularly join local armed groups. Children at the age of 14 are imprisoned alongside adults in GNC-controlled detention facilities (HRW 03/12/2015). Cases of forced recruitment and use of child soldiers by groups affiliated with IS have been documented (OHCHR 15/02/2016). Support structures are limited: During an assessment in 7 IDP camps in Tripoli and Benghazi (hosting almost 6,500 IDPs) almost all respondents reported they did not know of places where they could seek help for abused or runaway children (UNHCR/REACH 31/05/2016).

Oppression by jihadist groups: IS has imposed its radical interpretation of Sharia law on all aspects of life in Sirte. Diversion of food, medicine, fuel, and cash, along with homes it confiscated from residents to loyalists has been reported (HRW 10/05/2016).

Mines and ERW: ERW contamination in Libya remains extensive in all conflict-affected areas, although the exact quantity is unknown. Up to 300 ERW incidents were reported in Benghazi over a three-month period in 2015 (SCI and HI 21/03/2016).

MAIN INFORMATION GAPS

Additional information is required on:

- Coping mechanisms applied in the absence of the formal justice system
- Presence of mines and ERW
- Protection concerns within areas under control of jihadist groups

LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY

PRE-CRISIS CONTEXT

Main sources of income: The government of Libya provided the main sources of income to Libyan households. In 2012, the large majority of the population (84%) worked in the public sector (World Bank 2014). Government pensions were an additional important source of income and included all residents over 65 years of age, or 62 in case of civil servants (SSA 2013).

Poverty: According to official statistics, no households lived below the extreme poverty line (LD 336 per person per year, around USD 0.7 per person per day) in 2008. The extensive social protection and price subsidy system ensured access to basic necessities. Vulnerable families and people living below the poverty line who registered at the Endowment and Zakat affairs, for instance, received commodities at no cost (WFP 2011, World Bank 2014).

Sources of food: Libya's agricultural production is very limited and employed only 1% of the population in 2012. Up to 90% of the country's food requirements were imported (GIEWS 16/03/2016, WB 2014).


Food security: There is limited data on the levels of food security. As own production of food is uncommon, households are completely dependent on the market and access to income for food and other basic necessities. The most vulnerable are therefore those who rely on a single breadwinner and/or low-remunerating sources of income. Migrants were particularly vulnerable, as they were not entitled to subsidised food, and had to pay full market prices (WFP 2011).

CURRENT SITUATION

Food security status of population: Multiple assessments have recorded the adoption of negative coping mechanisms as a result of the food security situation, including taking high-risk jobs as well as sending children and other family members to beg, and selling productive assets (SCI and HI 21/03/2016, REACH 12/03/2016). IDPs assessed in Benghazi and Tripoli were found to adopt more crisis and emergency coping strategies than residents in the same areas. Food assistance is being provided by host communities and

Main sources of income in 2012

Source: World Bank 2014



households/relatives for IDPs; however, refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants do not benefit from such assistance (SCI and HI 21/03/2016, MSNA 29/09/2015, WFP 2011).

Sources of income: Public sector salaries and pensions remain the main source of income, even for those displaced. The main challenge to accessing income is the fact that the payments are delayed or halted. This is exacerbated by a dysfunctional banking system. The severe liquidity crisis has resulted in the closure of banks and limited cash withdrawals (CESVI 29/02/2016, REACH 12/03/2016, Libya's Channel 26/05/2016). It is unclear to what extent those in areas controlled by jihadist groups are still able to obtain pensions or public salary payments. Additional sources of income have emerged since the start of the uprising in 2011: Libyans in the Benghazi area have begun to perform informal manual labour, not before viewed as a suitable activity for non-migrant Libyans. An assessment in Tripoli and Benghazi showed unstable employment and daily labour are replacing income from the public sector, particularly among IDP households (SCI and HI 21/03/2016). An increase in informal market activities such as smuggling and foreign currency exchange has been reported (Reuters 01/06/2015, IBT 2015/10/11). Militia involved in armed conflict offer (temporary) employment opportunities – nearly 300,000 Libyan nationals had joined armed groups between 2011 and 2012 (LPRD 2012).

Food availability: Food shortages are reported, mainly in urban areas, following disrupted procurement and distribution systems (GIEWS 16/03/2016). The Price Stabilization Fund (PSF) is experiencing problems importing the required wheat because of reduced oil revenues and deteriorating currency exchange rates. Fighting and insecurity in Tripoli and Benghazi has affected the two main ports and interrupted movement of food, while fuel shortages and poor road conditions have made it difficult to transport food and other items between cities. (IOM 20/06/2016, MSNA 29/09/2015)

Food access: The breakdown of law and order has resulted in a lack of price regulation and significant price increases (REACH 12/03/2016). The black market exchange rate has risen and imports have become significantly more expensive. The primary barrier to food access in conflict-affected communities across Libya is therefore lack of financial resource coupled with rising food prices (MSNA 29/09/2015). Insecurity restricts the movement of people to markets, cooperatives, and retail outlets to buy food and other necessities (WFP 15/05/2016). Key informants highlighted the lack of cooking fuel on the market as an additional main barrier to accessing food (REACH 12/03/2016).

MAIN INFORMATION GAPS

- Functionality of markets, shops and the financial infrastructure
- Situation in areas controlled by jihadist groups, including Sirte.
- Market prices of main basic needs
- Functionality of the national wheat pipeline, particularly mills and cereal stocks

WATER, SANITATION, AND HYGIENE

PRE-CRISIS CONTEXT

Dependence on southern aquifers: As one of the countries with the lowest amount of rainfall in the world, the population is highly dependent on underground basin reserves. The GMMR (Great Man-Made River) pumps water from underground aquifers in the south to populated coastal areas. In 2010, 70% of the population relied on the system for water for drinking and irrigation (The Guardian 2011, The Economist 2011).

Access to improved water sources: In 2010, it was estimated that only around half of the population had access to improved water sources. Contamination of water sources due to sewage, oil by-products, and industrial waste is of major concern. The 2007 PPFAM survey showed a decline in the proportion of households relying on public taps as the main source of drinking water (from 58% in 2003 to 44% in 2007), probably owing to increased water pollution (JMP 2014, WFP 2011).

Access to sanitation was almost universal before the 2011 crisis. According to the 2007 PPFAM, 63% of households were connected to a liquid waste disposal network, and 40% were using septic tanks. Solid waste collection, like many public services in the country, relied heavily on the migrant labour force (JMP 2014).

CURRENT SITUATION

Access to (drinking) water: Despite damage to the GMMR and desalination treatment plants, the main water network remains the primary source of drinking water for the population (MSNA 29/09/2015). Nonetheless, disruptions, including due to deliberate action of armed groups, pollution, and lack of electricity have resulted in the increasing use of other sources of water (MSNA 29/09/2015, OHCHR 15/02/2016). In rural Benghazi, some of the population was found to be forced to buy water (SCI and HI 21/03/2016). With few ongoing repairs to critical infrastructure and the upcoming summer, access to safe drinking water is expected to be of increasing concern (IOM 05/2016).

Waste management: With the disruption of services and outflow of migrant labour, waste management services are no longer fully operational. In the east, an assessment in March found that garbage was left in the street or in public areas (REACH 12/03/2016).

MAIN INFORMATION GAPS

- Functionality of water infrastructure and particularly water treatment plants.
- Availability and price of water and water related NFIs on the market

EDUCATION

PRE-CRISIS CONTEXT

Education was free and compulsory starting at six years of age. Literacy rates were among the highest in North Africa, estimated at around 88% for those aged over 15 years and 100% for youth aged 15–24 years (WFP 2011).

In Benghazi and Tripoli in mid-2014, there were an estimated 256,000 students in public basic education in 454 schools; between 46,000 and 70,000 students were estimated to be attending public secondary education in 121–147 secondary schools in the two cities. (HCT, 2014).

Migrant children do not benefit from free education and there is no data in their attendance rates. Education fees can reach US\$2,000 per child per year (WFP 2011).

CURRENT SITUATION

Out of 239 schools assessed by the Ministry of Education in mid-2015, 110 were inaccessible due to the conflict and 64 were occupied by IDPs (HNO 2015/09). Schools have also been converted to military posts (OHCHR 15/02/2016). Some 44,500 IDPs are residing in school buildings (IOM 06/2016). Occupation of schools by IDPs is reported as the primary barrier to accessing formal education in eastern Libya (REACH 29/02/2016).

Benghazi is particularly affected by reduced education, with enrolment rates as low as 50%. 136 out of 286 schools in Benghazi (47.6%) need varying degrees of repair (UNICEF 31/01/2016). At the end of 2015, 71 schools in the city were hosting IDPs and several occupied by armed groups (UNHCR 12/2015, UNICEF 31/05/2016).

MAIN INFORMATION GAPS

- Functionality of schools
- Attendance rates

HEALTH AND NUTRITION

PRE-CRISIS CONTEXT


State-run healthcare was provided free of charge in most areas of the country (WHO 05/2015).

Foreign health workers made up around 60% of personnel in the health sector, especially in the south of the country (WHO 05/2015).

Non-communicable diseases accounted for the main causes of death:

The main causes of death in 2010 were non-communicable

Source: WHO 05/2015



CURRENT SITUATION

Breakdown of health infrastructure: 60–70% of hospitals are closed or only partially functioning, according to Libya's Minister of Health (Le Figaro 03/04/2016). Shelling of medical infrastructure has resulted in the partial or total destruction of facilities. Multiple attacks at the end of May on Benghazi Medical Centre, the only health facility providing tertiary health care to more than 500,000 people, caused significant damage. (WHO 30/05/2016, OHCHR 15/02/2016, REACH 12/03/2016). Attacks on medical personnel and services are common, and in some areas armed groups have taken full control of health facilities, with Islamic State, for instance, using health facilities in Sirte primarily to provide services to their fighters (WSJ 29/11/2015, BBC 03/02/2016). Hospitals in relatively safe areas are overburdened due to the increase in caseload and limited functionality (SCI and HI 21/03/2016).

Shortages of staff, medicines, and supplies: There are widespread shortages of qualified staff following the massive exodus of foreign health workers and harassment and abduction of health staff by different armed groups (OHCHR 15/02/2016). In addition, "ghost health personnel", whereby health workers are on the payroll and receive salaries but do not turn up for work, is contributing to the lack of health personnel.

There is a life-threatening lack of medicine and supplies as a result of the unavailability of funding (Le Figaro 03/4/2016). There are difficulties in importing and transporting medical commodities and facilities have been looted (SCI and HI 21/03/2016, WHO 05/2015). In parts of urban Tripoli as well as urban and rural Benghazi, a lack of necessary medication was observed in February, especially for chronic diseases, in addition to the lack of vaccinations (SCI and HI 21/03/2016). Households in Benghazi and Tripoli report significant gaps in the provision of medicine, healthcare and psychosocial assistance (SCI and HI 21/03/2016).

During a rapid assessment in June 2016 in Misratah, access to health care was highlighted as one of the main concerns. Misratah Central Hospital is operating far below its capacity, with only half of the 800 beds available and a lack of specialised medical teams to respond to the casualties coming in from Sirte (OCHA 16/06/2016).

Obstacles to accessing existing healthcare: Access to available services is hampered by limited freedom of movement, particularly in areas with active conflict and those controlled by jihadist groups. Emergency transportation to hospitals has been affected by attacks on ambulances, fuel shortages, and poor communication (OHCHR 15/02/2016, WHO 05/2015). Households struggle to pay for healthcare. In Benghazi and Tripoli, households identified lack of information on how to access healthcare as main problem (SCI and HI 21/03/2016). Migrants and groups perceived as having supported the al Qadhafi Government face discrimination accessing health services (OHCHR 02/2016).

Health status of population: It can be assumed that morbidity and mortality have increased following the breakdown of health services. However, there is no publicly available information on disease incidence and trends. Although pre-crisis nutritional data indicate low levels of malnutrition, the combination of displacement, limited access to healthcare, and food is likely to have resulted in an increase in malnutrition rates.

MAIN INFORMATION GAPS

- The status of hospitals and medical facilities by area
- Disease incidence
- Nutrition status of children under five

SHELTER


PRE-CRISIS CONTEXT

85% of the population resided in urban areas in 2011. The Libyan government regularly confiscated private land, some of which was redistributed to the landless or to allies. All rental payments for property were abolished in 1986, instantly changing all residential tenants into owners (USAID 2011).


CURRENT SITUATION

Substandard shelter: The over 425,000 IDPs are hosted mainly in urban private settings, in rented accommodation. Although it is generally considered that private rented accommodation is safer, an assessment in February highlights that even rented accommodation is often of low quality, without adequate privacy, security, or security of tenure (IOM 06/2016, UNHCR 11/02/2016). Migrants are largely residing in sub-standard shelter as well. Almost half of the over 230,000 migrants recorded within the May DTM reside in informal settlements (IOM 05/2016). There is no recent information on the level of conflict damage to private housing or the number of non-displaced residing in houses that are substandard.

IDPs - 425,250



Migrants - 264,000



IOM 05/2016,
IOM 06/2016

High rents and evacuations: IDPs in Benghazi and Tripoli identified shelter as first priority need for IDPs, particularly rental support. Families assessed in these cities allocate one-third of their expenditure to rent and housing (SCI and HI 21/03/2016, IOM 05/2016). The MSNA recorded a high risk of eviction of IDPs in east Libya (REACH 12/03/2016).

MAIN INFORMATION GAPS

- Extent of damage and destruction to private housing
- Rental prices by geographic area

About this report: This overview is based on an analysis of secondary data available to ACAPS in June 2016. The objective of the document is to inform strategic decision making on the humanitarian crisis in Libya, by outlining the current drivers of the humanitarian crisis, main needs and remaining information gaps. ACAPS welcomes all information that could complement this report. For additional information, comments or questions please contact us at: info@acaps.org